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1 Introduction
Two-sided, many-to-one matching models have been used to study assignment problems
where agents can be divided, from the very beginning, into two disjoint subsets: the set
of institutions and the set of individuals. The fundamental question of these assignment
problems consists of matching each firm, on one side, with a group of workers, on the other
side (we will follow the convention of generically referring to institutions as firms and to
individuals as workers). A matching is called stable if all agents have acceptable partners
and there is no unmatched worker-firm pair who both would prefer to be matched to each
other rather than staying with their current partners.
The “college admissions model with substitutable preferences” is the name given by Roth
and Sotomayor (1990) to the most general many-to-one model with ordinal preferences in
which stable matchings exist. Firms are restricted to have substitutable preferences over
subsets of workers; namely, all firms continue to want to employ a worker even if other
workers become unavailable (Kelso and Crawford (1982) were the first to use this property
in a more general model with money). Under this hypothesis the deferred-acceptance
algorithms produce either the firms-optimal stable matching or the workers-optimal stable
matching, depending on whether the firms or the workers make the oﬀers. The firms
(workers)-optimal stable matching is unanimously considered by all firms (respectively,
workers) to be the best among all stable matchings.
A more specific many-to-one model, called the “college admissions problem” by Gale
and Shapley (1962), supposes that firms have a maximum number of positions to be filled
(their quota), and that each firm, given its ranking of individual workers, orders subsets of
workers in a responsive manner; namely, for any two subsets that diﬀer in only one student
a college prefers the subset containing the most-preferred student. In this model the set
of stable matchings satisfies many desirable properties.1 The first type of properties are
more theoretical in nature and are related with its lattice structure. The second type of
properties have more practical implications and are related with the strategic incentives of
agents participating in markets where centralized mechanisms are used to propose to par-
ticipants their corresponding partners of a particular stable matching (stable mechanisms).2
1Observe that the marriage model (i.e., the one-to-one matching model) is a particular instance of the
“college admissions problem” when all firms have quota one.
2Roth (1984, 1986, 1990, and 1991), Mongell and Roth (1991), Roth and Xing (1994), and Romero-
Medina (1998) are examples of papers studying these incentives in particular matching problems like entry-
level professional labor markets, student admissions at colleges, american sororities, etc.
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However, whether or not a matching is stable depends on the preferences of agents and,
since they constitute private information, agents have to be asked for them; hence, un-
truthful reports might arise. This is the reason why the matching literature has intensively
studied the strategic properties of stable mechanisms. In particular, Dubins and Freedman
(1981) shows that in the “college admissions problem” the deferred-acceptance algorithm
in which workers make oﬀers is group strategy-proof for the workers.3 This is important
because it means that if the mechanism selects for each preference profile its corresponding
workers-optimal stable matching then, no group of workers can never benefit by reporting
untruthfully their preference relations.
It is well-known that this group strategy-proofness property is not necessarily true
when the preferences of firms are substitutable. The purpose of this paper is to consider a
weaker condition than responsiveness, called quota q−separability, that together with sub-
stitutability implies that the property that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group
strategy-proof for the workers holds for this more general many-to-one matching model.4 A
firm is said to have separable preferences over all subsets of workers if its partition between
acceptable and unacceptable workers has the property that only adding acceptable workers
makes any given subset of workers a better one. However, in many applications such as
the entry-level professional labor markets, separability alone does not seem very reasonable
because firms usually have fewer openings (their quota) than the number of “good” workers
looking for a job. In these cases it seems reasonable to restrict the preferences of firms in
such a way that the separability condition operates only up to their quota, considering
unacceptable all subsets with higher cardinality. Moreover, while responsiveness seems the
relevant property for extending an ordered list of individual students to preferences on all
subsets of students, it is too restrictive, though, to capture some degree of complementarity
among workers, which can be very natural in other settings. The quota q−separability con-
3To be precise, they show it for the marriage model, but their result can be extended to the college
admissions problem. Some results concerning stability in the college admissions problem are immediate
consequences of the fact that they hold for the marriage model. Each college is split into as many pieces as
positions it has, so transforming the original many-to-one model into a one-to-one model. Responsiveness
allows then the translation of stability from one model to another. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a
complete description of this procedure as well as for its applications.
4We have already showed that if firms have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences then, (a)
the set of unmatched agents is the same in all stable matchings (Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2000)
and (b) the set of stable matchings has a lattice structure with two natural binary operations (Martínez,
Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2001).
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dition permits greater flexibility in going from orders on individuals to orders on subsets.
For instance, candidates for a job can be grouped together by areas of specialization. A firm
with quota two may consider as the best subset of workers not the set consisting of the first
two candidates on the individual ranking (which may have both the same specialization)
but rather the subset composed of the first and fourth candidates in the individual ranking
(i.e.; the first in each area of specialization).
As it is the case for the college admissions problem, the property that (in this more gen-
eral many-to-one matching model) the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-
proof for the workers is an immediate consequence of the following result (known in the
literature as the Blocking Lemma): Suppose that the set of workers that strictly prefer an
individually rational matching to the workers-optimal stable matching is nonempty. Then,
we can always find a firm and a worker (a blocking pair of the individually rational match-
ing) with the following properties: (a) the firm was hiring another worker who strictly
prefers the individually rational matching to the workers-optimal stable matching and (b)
the worker (member of the blocking pair) considers the workers-optimal stable matching
to be at least as good as the individually rational matching. Furthermore, and in order
to prove the Blocking Lemma, we also show that the workers-optimal stable matching is
weakly Pareto optimal for the workers; namely, there is no individually rational matching
that all workers strictly prefer to the workers-optimal stable matching.
Since our many-to-one matching model includes (as a particular subclass) the college
admissions problem, all negative results concerning strategic incentives of agents of the
latter model carry over to the former one. In particular, (1) the workers-optimal stable
mechanism is not group strategy-proof for the firms (it is not even strategy-proof for them)
and (2) there is no stable and strategy-proof mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the preliminary notation and
definitions. In Section 3 we prove that if firms have substitutable and quota q−separable
preferences then, the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the
workers (Theorem 1). Furthermore, we exhibit an example (Example 2) showing that this
result is not true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q−separable. In
Section 4 we formally define a mechanism and state the main result of the paper: if firms
have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences then, the workers-optimal stable
mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers (Theorem 2). Moreover, in Theorem 3
we state that the Blocking Lemma holds for our many-to-one model. Finally, the Appendix
in Section 5 contains the proof of Theorem 3, the key result used to prove Theorem 2.
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2 Preliminaries
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n firms F = {f1, ..., fn} and the set of m
workers W = {w1, ..., wm}. Generic elements of both sets will be denoted, respectively, by
f , f , and ef , and by w, w, and ew. Each worker w ∈W has a strict, transitive, and complete
preference relation P (w) over F ∪ {∅}, and each firm f ∈ F has a strict, transitive, and
complete preference relation P (f) over 2W . Preference profiles are (n+m)-tuples of pref-
erence relations and they are represented by P = (P (f1) , ..., P (fn) ;P (w1) , ..., P (wm)).
Given a preference relation of a firm P (f) the subsets of workers preferred to the empty set
by f are called acceptable. Similarly, given a preference relation of a worker P (w) the firms
preferred by w to the empty set are called acceptable. Therefore, we are allowing for the
possibility that firm f may prefer not to hire any worker rather than to hire unacceptable
subsets of workers and that worker w may prefer to remain unemployed rather than to
work for an unacceptable firm. To express preference relations in a concise manner, and
since only acceptable partners will matter, we will represent preference relations as lists of
acceptable partners. For instance,
P (fi) : w1w3, w2, w1
P (wj) : f1, f3
indicate that {w1, w3}P (fi) {w2}P (fi) {w1}P (fi) ∅ and f1P (wj) f3P (wj) ∅.
A matching market is a triple (F,W,P ), where F is a set of firms, W is a set of workers,
and P is a preference profile. Given a matching market (F,W,P ) the assignment problem
consists of matching workers with firms, keeping the bilateral nature of their relationship
and allowing for the possibility that both, firms and workers, may remain unmatched.
Formally,
Definition 1 A matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪W into the set of all subsets
of F ∪W such that for all w ∈W and f ∈ F :
1. Either |µ (w)| = 1 and µ (w) ⊆ F or else µ (w) = ∅.
2. µ (f) ⊆ 2W .
3. µ (w) = {f} if and only if w ∈ µ (f) .
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Condition 1 says that a worker can either be matched to at most one firm or remain
unmatched. Condition 2 says that a firm can either hire a subset of workers or be un-
matched. Finally, condition 3 states the bilateral nature of a matching in the sense that
firm f hires worker w if and only if worker w works for firm f . We say that w and f are
unmatched in a matching µ if µ (w) = ∅ and µ (f) = ∅. Otherwise, they are matched. A
matching µ is said to be one-to-one if firms can hire at most one worker; namely, Condition
2 is replaced by: Either |µ (f)| = 1 and µ (f) ⊆ W or else µ (f) = ∅. The model in which
all matchings are one-to-one is also known in the literature as the marriage model. The
model in which all matchings are many-to-one (i.e., they satisfy Definition 1), and firms
have responsive preferences,5 is also known in the literature as the college admissions model
(Gale and Shapley, 1962). To represent matchings concisely we will follow the widespread
notation where, for instance, given F = {f1, f2, f3} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4},
f1 f2 f3 ∅
µ w3w4 w1 ∅ w2
represents the matching where firm f1 is matched to workersw3 andw4, firm f2 is matched to
worker w1, and firm f3 and worker w2 are unmatched. Given a matching µ and two subsets
F 0 ⊆ F and W 0 ⊆ W we denote by µ (F 0) and µ (W 0) the sets {w ∈W | µ (w) ∈ F 0} and
{f ∈ F | ∃w ∈W 0 such that w ∈ µ (f)}, respectively.
Let P be a preference profile. Given a set of workers S ⊆ W , let Ch (S, P (f)) denote
firm f ’s most-preferred subset of S according to its preference ordering P (f). Generically
we will refer to this set as the choice set. Blair (1988) shows that the choice set satisfies
the following property.
Remark 1 Let P (f) be any preference and assume A and B are two subsets of workers
such that Ch (A,P (f)) ⊆ B ⊆ A. Then, Ch (A,P (f)) = Ch (B,P (f)) .
A matching µ is blocked by worker w if ∅P (w)µ (w). A matching µ is blocked by firm
f if µ (f) 6= Ch (µ (f) , P (f)). We say that a matching is individually rational if it is
not blocked by any individual agent. We will denote by IR (P ) the set of individually
rational matchings. A matching µ is blocked by a firm-worker pair (f, w) if w /∈ µ (f),
w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w} , P (f)), and fP (w)µ (w).
5Roughly, for any two subsets of workers that diﬀer in only one worker a firm prefers the subset con-
taining the most-preferred worker. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a precise and formal definition of
responsive preferences as well as for a masterful and illuminating analysis of these models and an exhaustive
bibliography.
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Definition 2 A matching µ is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent or any
firm-worker pair.
Given a preference profile P , denote the set of stable matchings by S (P ). It is easy to
construct examples of preference profiles with the property that the set of stable matchings
is empty. These examples share the feature that at least one firm regards a subset of workers
as being complements. This is the reason why the literature has focused on the restriction
where workers are regarded as substitutes.
Definition 3 A firm f ’s preference relation P (f) satisfies substitutability if for any set S
containing workers w and w0 (w 6= w0), if w ∈ Ch (S, P (f)) then w ∈ Ch (S\ {w0} , P (f)).
A preference profile P is substitutable if for each firm f , the preference relation P (f)
satisfies substitutability.
Blair (1988) shows that the choice set of substitutable preference relations have the
following property.
Remark 2 Let P (f) be a substitutable preference relation and assume A and B are two
subsets of workers. Then, Ch (A ∪B,P (f)) = Ch (Ch (A,P (f)) ∪B,P (f)) .
Kelso and Crawford (1982) shows that (in a more general model with money) if all
firms have substitutable preferences then: (1) the set of stable matchings is non-empty, and
(2) firms unanimously agree that a stable matching µF is the best stable matching. Roth
(1984) extends these results and shows that if all firms have substitutable preferences then:
(3) workers unanimously agree that a stable matching µW is the best stable matching,
6 and
(4) the optimal stable matching for one side is the worst stable matching for the other side.
That is, S (P ) 6= ∅ and for all µ ∈ S (P ) we have that µFR (f)µR (f)µW for all f ∈ F and
µWR (w)µR (w)µF for all w ∈W .
The deferred-acceptance algorithm, originally defined by Gale and Shapley (1962) for
the marriage model, produces either µF or µW depending on who makes the oﬀers. At any
6The matchings µF and µW are called, respectively, the firms-optimal stable matching and the workers-
optimal stable matching. We are following the convention of extending preferences from the original sets
(2W and F ∪ {∅}) to the set of matchings. However, we now have to consider weak orderings since the
matchings µ and µ0 may associate to an agent the same partner. These orderings will be denoted by R (f)
and R (w). For instance, to say that all firms prefer µF to any stable µ means that for every f ∈ F we
have that µFR (f)µ for all stable µ (that is, either µF (f) = µ (f) or else µF (f)P (f)µ (f)).
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step of the algorithm in which firms make oﬀers, a firm proposes itself to the choice set
of the set of workers that have not already rejected it during the previous steps, while a
worker accepts the oﬀer of the best firm among the set of current oﬀers plus the one made
by the firm provisionally matched in the previous step (if any). The algorithm stops at the
step at which all oﬀers are accepted; the (provisional) matching then becomes definite and
it is the firms-optimal stable matching µF . Symmetrically, at any step of the algorithm
in which workers make oﬀers, a worker proposes himself to the best firm among the set of
firms that have not already rejected him during the previous steps, while a firm accepts the
choice set of the set of current oﬀers plus that of the workers provisionally matched in the
previous step (if any). The algorithm stops at the step at which all oﬀers are accepted; the
(provisional) matching then becomes definite and it is the workers-optimal stable matching
µW .
A firm f has separable preferences if the division between good workers ({w}P (f) ∅)
and bad workers (∅P (f) {w}) guides the ordering of subsets in the sense that adding a good
worker leads to a better set, while adding a bad worker leads to a worse set.7 Formally,
Definition 4 A firm f ’s preference relation P (f) satisfies separability if for all S ⊆ W
and w /∈ S we have that (S ∪ {w})P (f)S if and only if {w}P (f)∅.
A preference profile P is separable if for each firm f , the preference relation P (f) satisfies
separability.
Remark 3 All separable preference relations are substitutable. To see this, just note that if
P (f) is separable then, for every S ⊆W , Ch (S, P (f)) = {w ∈ S | {w}P (f) ∅}. Moreover,
the preference relation
P (f) : w1, w1w2, w2
shows that not all substitutable preference relations are separable.
Sönmez (1996) shows that if firms have separable preferences then there exists a unique
stable matching. A simple way to construct this unique stable matching µ is as follows:
7This condition has been extensively used in social choice; see, for instance, Barberà, Sonnenschein, and
Zhou (1991). In the matching literature Sönmez (1996), Dutta and Massó (1997), Martínez, Massó, Neme,
and Oviedo (2000) and (2001) have made use of it to study, respectively, strategy-proof implementation,
the stability of matchings when workers also care about their colleagues, the set of unmatched agents in
diﬀerent stable matchings, and the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings.
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for each w ∈W , let µ (w) be the maximal element, according to P (w), on the set of firms
for which w is an acceptable worker, i.e., {f ∈ F | {w}P (f) ∅}. The stability of µ follows
directly from separability of firms’ preferences.
Here, we will assume that each firm f has, in addition to substitutable and separable
preferences, a maximum number of positions to be filled: its quota qf . This limitation may
arise from, for example, technological, legal, or budgetary reasons. Since we are interested
in stable matchings we introduce this restriction by incorporating it into the preference
relation of the firm. The college admissions model with responsive preferences (Gale and
Shapley, 1962) incorporates the quota restriction of each college by imposing a limit on the
number of students that a college may admit . However, from the point of view of stability,
this is equivalent to supposing that all sets of students with cardinality larger than the
quota are unacceptable for the college. Therefore, even if the number of good workers for
firm f is larger than its quota qf , all sets of workers with cardinality strictly larger than qf
will be unacceptable. Formally,
Definition 5 A firm f ’s preference relation P (f) over sets of workers is qf−separable if:
(a) for all S (W such that |S| < qf and w /∈ S we have that (S ∪ {w})P (f)S if and only
if {w}P (f)∅, and (b) ∅P (f)S for all S such that |S| > qf .8
We will denote by q = (qf)f∈F the list of quotas and we will say that a preference profile
P is quota q−separable if each P (f) is quota qf−separable. In principle we may have
firms with diﬀerent quotas. The case where all firms have quota 1−separable preferences
is equivalent, from the point of view of the set of stable matchings, to the marriage model.
Hence, our set-up includes the marriage model as a particular case.
The two preference relations over 2{w1,w2,w3}
P (f) : w1w2, w1w3, w2w3, w1, w2, w3
P
¡
f
¢
: w1w2w3, w1w2, w1w3, w2w3, w1, w2, w3
illustrate the fact that, in general and given a list of quotas q, the sets of separable and quota
q−separable preferences are unrelated. Firm f ’s preference relation is 2−separable but not
8For the purpose of studying the set of stable matchings, condition (b) in this definition could be replaced
by the following condition: |Ch (S, P (f))| ≤ qf for all S such that |S| > qf . We choose condition (b) since
it is simpler. Sönmez (1996) uses an alternative approach which consists of deleting condition (b) in the
definition but then requiring in the definition of a matching that |µ (f)| ≤ qf for all f ∈ F . Notice that in
his approach the set of separable preferences is quota qf−separable for all qf .
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separable, since ∅P (f) {w1, w2, w3} and all workers are good, while firm f ’s preference
relation is separable but not quota 2−separable.
Moreover, the preference relation over 2{w1,w2,w3,w4}
P (f) : w1w2, w3w4, w1w3, w1w4, w2w3, w2w4, w1, w2, w3, w4
illustrates the fact that quota q−separability does not imply substitutability. To see this,
notice that the preference relation P (f) is quota 2−separable but it is not substitutable
since w1 ∈ Ch ({w1, w2, w3, w4} , P (f)) = {w1, w2}, but w1 /∈ Ch ({w1, w3, w4} , P (f)) =
{w3, w4}. However, it is easy to see that all quota (m− 1)−separable preferences are
substitutable.
The preference relation P (f) over 2{w1,w2,w3}
P (f) : w1w2w3, w1w3, w1w2, w2w3, w1, w2, w3
illustrates the fact that the set of responsive preferences is a strict subset of the set of
quota qf−separable and substitutable preferences, since P (f) is quota 3−separable and
substitutable but it is not responsive because {w1, w3}P (f) {w1, w2} but {w2}P (f) {w3}.
The following example shows that even if all firms have quota q−separable preferences
the set of stable matchings may be empty.
Example 1 Let F = {f1, f2} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} be the two sets of agents with
the preference profile P , where
P (f1) : w3w4, w2w4, w1w2, w1w3, w2w3, w1w4, w1, w2, w3, w4,
P (f2) : w3, w4,
P (w1) : f1,
P (w2) : f1,
P (w3) : f1, f2,
P (w4) : f2, f1.
Notice that P is quota (2, 1)−separable. However, P (f1) is not substitutable since w3 ∈
Ch (W,P (f1)) but w3 /∈ Ch (W\ {w4} , P (f1)). It can be verified that S (P ) = ∅.
We close this section with a remark about the set of unmatched agents in diﬀerent stable
matchings.
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Remark 4 If firms have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences then the set of
unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching.9
3 Weak Pareto Optimality
For the marriage model Roth (1982) shows that optimal stable matchings have an even
stronger optimality property: there is no individually rational matching that all agents
of one side of the market strictly prefer to their corresponding optimal stable matching.
Roth (1985) partly extends this result to the college admissions problem. He shows (using
the result of the marriage model) that this weak Pareto optimality property holds for the
students (the “one side” of the market); moreover, he also shows that the property is in
general false for the colleges (the “many side” of the market). In this section we exhibit
an example (Example 2) where firms have substitutable preferences and the weak Pareto
optimality property does not even hold for the workers; that is, there is an individually
rational matching strictly preferred by all workers (our “one side” of the market) to the
workers-optimal stable matching. Additionally, we show in Theorem 1 that if firms prefer-
ences are also quota q−separable the weak Pareto optimality for the workers holds again.
In our case, however, the proof is genuinely many-to-one since it can not be based on the
fact that the result holds for the marriage model.
Theorem 1 Assume P is substitutable and quota q−separable. Then, there is no individ-
ually rational matching µ such that µ(w)P (w)µW (w) for all w ∈W .
Proof. Assume that µ ∈ IR (P ) and
µ(w)P (w)µW (w) for all w ∈W. (1)
Since µW is also individually rational, µ (w) 6= ∅ for all w ∈ W . Therefore, µ (W ) is
nonempty.
Claim A µ (W ) = µW (W ).
9See Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2000) for a proof of Remark 4 and an example illustrating that
if firms have substitutable preferences (but not quota q−separable) the set of unmatched agents under two
stable matchings may be diﬀerent. Gale and Sotomayor (1985) and Roth (1984) proved independently that
for the college admissions problem the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching.
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Proof of Claim A. Let f ∈ µ (W ). Then f = µ (w) for some w. Observe that
µW (f) ∈ 2W\ {∅}. Otherwise (µW (f) = ∅), by the individual rationality of µ and the
quota qf−separability of P (f), {w}P (f) ∅, implying that (f,w) would block µW , contra-
dicting its stability. Therefore,
µ (W ) ⊆ µW (W ) . (2)
Since all workers are matched at µ we already know that
P
f∈µ(W ) |µ (f)| = |W |. To
see that the same property holds for matching µW assume
P
f∈µ(W ) |µW (f)| < |W |. There-
fore, there exists f ∈ F such that
¯¯
µW
¡
f
¢¯¯
<
¯¯
µ
¡
f
¢¯¯
≤ qf , implying that we can find
w ∈ µ
¡
f
¢ \µW ¡f¢. Since µ ∈ IR (P ), w ∈ Ch ¡µ ¡f¢ , P ¡f¢¢, yielding by the quota
qf−separability of P
¡
f
¢
, {w}P ¡f¢ ∅; therefore, because ¯¯µW ¡f¢¯¯ < qf ,
w ∈ Ch
¡
µW
¡
f
¢
∪ {w} , P ¡f¢¢ . (3)
The fact that f = µ (w)P (w)µW (w) and condition (3) imply that
¡
f,w
¢
blocks µW ,
contradicting its stability. Therefore,X
f∈µ(W )
|µW (f)| = |W | . (4)
Hence, |W | ≥Pf∈F |µW (f)| =Pf∈µ(W ) |µW (f)|+Pf∈F\µ(W ) |µW (f)|, implying, by con-
dition (4) that
P
f∈F\µ(W ) |µW (f)| = 0. Therefore, if f ∈ F\µ (W ) then µW (f) = ∅, which
means that f /∈ µW (W ), implying that F\µ (W ) ⊆ F\µW (W ). Hence, µW (W ) ⊆ µ (W )
and, by condition (2),
µ (W ) = µW (W ) . (5)
Claim A is proved.
Claim B µW (µ (W )) =W.
Proof of Claim B. Assume otherwise; that is, there exists w0 ∈ W such that w0 /∈
µW (µ (W )). Since µW (W ) = µ (W ), µW (w
0) = ∅; therefore,X
f∈µ(W )
|µW (f)| < |W | =
X
f∈µ(W )
|µ (f)| ,
where the equality follows from condition (1). Therefore, there exists f ∈ µ (W ) such that¯¯
µW
¡
f
¢¯¯
<
¯¯
µ
¡
f
¢¯¯
≤ qf , implying that we can find w ∈ µ
¡
f
¢ \µW ¡f¢. By condition
(1), f = µ (w)P (w)µW (w) and by the quota qf−separability of P
¡
f
¢
and the individual
rationality of µ, the pair
¡
f,w
¢
blocks µW in contradiction with its stability. Therefore,
µW (µ (W )) =W. (6)
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Claim B is proved.
Consider now the last step of the deferred acceptance algorithm where workers make
oﬀers (and which yields, as its outcome, matching µW ). Let w be a worker who makes an
oﬀer to an acceptable firm f in the last step of the algorithm. If f rejects some worker w0,
then this worker is unmatched in µW since we are considering the last step of the algorithm;
this contradicts Claim B. Therefore, f does not reject any worker. By the substitutability
of P (f) and condition (1)
µW (f) = Ch(Sf,w ∪ {w}, P (f)) = Ch(Sf,w, P (f)) ∪ {w} ⊇ µ (f) ∪ {w} ,
where Sf,w = {w ∈ W\ {w} | w makes an oﬀer to f during the algorithm}. The last
inclusion holds because µ(f) ⊆ Sf,w (condition (1) implies that all w ∈ µ (f) make an oﬀer
to f during the algorithm). Therefore,
µW (f) ⊇ µ (f) ∪ {w} . (7)
Then, since w /∈ µ (f), we have that qf ≥ |µW (f)| ≥ |µ (f)| + 1 and thus, |µ (f)| < qf .
If |µ(f)| > 0 then we can find w ∈ µ(f) ∩ µW (f) contradicting condition (1). Therefore,
|µ(f)| = 0 which implies that µ(f) = ∅. Condition (7) says that w ∈ µW (f) holds. Hence,
we obtain a contradiction, since f ∈ µW (W ) and f /∈ µ (W ) imply that Claim A does not
hold.
Example 2 below shows that the statement of Theorem 1 is false without the assumption
that P is quota q−separable.
Example 2 Let F = {f1, f2, f3} andW = {w1, w2, w3, w4} be the two sets of agents with
the substitutable preference profile P , where
P (f1) : w1w2, w2, w1, w4,
P (f2) : w3, w2w4, w1w2, w4, w1, w2,
P (f3) : w4, w1, w3,
P (w1) : f2, f3, f1,
P (w2) : f2, f1,
P (w3) : f3, f2,
P (w4) : f2, f1, f3.
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The workers-optimal stable matching is
f1 f2 f3
µW w1w2 w3 w4.
The individually rational matching
f1 f2 f3
µ w4 w1w2 w3
has the property that µ(w)P (w)µW (w) for all w ∈W .
4 Group strategy-proofness
The following notation and definitions are needed to state the main result of the paper. Let
S be the set of substitutable and quota q−separable preference relations of firms on 2W and
let T be the set of all preference relations of workers on F ∪{∅}. The set of all substitutable
and quota q−separable preference profiles can be written as the set P = Sn × T m, where
n and m are the number of firms and workers, respectively. Denote by M the set of all
matchings.
Amechanism h : P →M maps each preference profile P ∈ P to a matching h (P ) ∈M.
Therefore, h (P ) (f) is the set of workers assigned to f and h (P ) (w) is the firm assigned
to w (if any) at preference profile P by mechanism h. To emphasize the role of a subset of
workers cW we will write the preference profile P as ¡PcW , P−cW¢. Therefore, given cW ⊆W ,
P ∈ P and bPcW ∈ T |cW | we write ³ bPcW , P−cW´ to denote the preference profile P where the
preference relations PcW ∈ T |cW | have been replaced by bPcW ∈ T |cW |. Mechanisms require
each agent to report some preference relation. A mechanism is group strategy-proof for the
workers if it is always in the best interest of all subsets of workers to reveal their preferences
truthfully. Formally,
Definition 6 A mechanism h : P →M is group strategy-proof for the workers if for
all preference profiles P ∈ P, all subsets of workers cW ⊆W, and all reports bPcW ∈ T |cW |,
h (P ) (w)R (w)h
³ bPcW , P−cW´ (w)
for all w ∈ cW .
13
We say that h : P → M is the workers-optimal stable mechanism if it always selects
the workers-optimal stable matching; that is, for all P ∈ P, h (P ) is the workers-optimal
stable matching relative to P . We are now ready to state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 2 The workers-optimal stable mechanism h : P →M is group strategy-proof for
the workers.
Theorem 2 (as it is the case for the marriage model) is an immediate consequence of the
Blocking Lemma, which states that if the set of workers that strictly prefer an individually
rational matching µ to µW is nonempty then, we can always find a blocking pair (f,w)
of µ with the property that f was hiring at µ a worker strictly preferring µ to µW and w
considers µW being at least as good as µ. Gale and Sotomayor (1985) proved the Blocking
Lemma for the marriage model. Here, in Theorem 3 below, we state that the Blocking
Lemma also holds for the more general many-to-one model with substitutable and quota
q−separable preferences, and hence Theorem 2 holds.10
Theorem 3 Let P be a substitutable and quota q−separable preference profile and let µ ∈
IR (P ). Denote by W 0 = {w ∈W | µ (w)P (w)µW (w)} the set of workers who strictly
prefer µ to µW . If W
0 is nonempty, then there exist f ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈ W\W 0 such that
the pair (f,w) blocks µ.
Example 2 at the end of Section 3 shows that Theorems 2 and 3 are false without the
quota q−separability condition. Theorem 3 is false because µ is not stable since the (unique)
pair (f2, w4) blocks µ but w4 ∈ W 0 because µ (w4) = f1P (w4) f3 = µW (w4). Moreover,
consider the preference relations bPW ∈ T 4, where
bP (w1) : f2,bP (w2) : f2,bP (w3) : f3,bP (w4) : f1.
Let h be the workers-optimal stable mechanism. Then, h
³ bPW , P−W´ = µP (w)µW = h (P )
for all w ∈W , implying that h is not group strategy-proof for the workers.
10In the marriage model the Blocking Lemma also plays a fundamental role in the proof of the Strong
Stability Theorem of Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1987).
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The proof of Theorem 3 is in the Appendix. We warn the reader that it is involved and
long. However, we will try to guide the reader through its main building blocks as well
as to point out why the proof of the Blocking Lemma in the marriage model can not be
immediately translated to the many-to-one case.
Proof of Theorem 2. The statement of Theorem 2 follows immediately from the fol-
lowing Claim.
Claim Let P be a substitutable and quota q−separable profile of preferences and let bP
diﬀer from P in that some nonempty subsetcW of workers have diﬀerent preferences. Then,
there is no matching µ ∈ S( bP ) such that µP (w)µW by all w ∈cW.
Proof of Claim. Assume otherwise; that is, there exists a nonempty subset of workerscW and a matching µ ∈ S( bP ) such that for all w ∈ cW, µ(w)P (w)µW (w). We first show
that µ ∈ IR (P ). Since µ ∈ S( bP ) and bP (i) = P (i) for all i ∈ (F ∪W ) \cW , then µ is
individually rational for all i /∈ cW . Moreover, if w ∈ cW then µ(w)P (w)µW (w)R(w)∅.
Hence, µ ∈ IR (P ). Since all matchings µ0 ∈ S (P ) have the property that µWR (w)µ0
for all w ∈ W and there exists at least one w ∈ cW with µ(w)P (w)µW (w), we conclude
that µ /∈ S (P ) . Since cW 6= ∅, we can apply the Blocking Lemma (Theorem 3) because
∅ 6=cW ⊆W 0 = {w ∈W | µ(w)P (w)µW (w)}. Thus, there is a pair (f, w), where f ∈ µ(W 0)
and w ∈W\W 0, that blocks µ in P , but w ∈W\W 0 implies that bP (w) = P (w); therefore,
(f, w) blocks µ in bP , contradicting that µ ∈ S( bP ).
5 Appendix: The Proof of the Blocking Lemma
Through out all this Appendix we will assume that P is a substitutable and quota q−separable
profile of preferences and that µ ∈ IR (P ). The set of workers who strictly prefer µ to µW
will be denoted by W 0 = {w ∈W | µ (w)P (w)µW (w)} and we will assume that W 0 is
nonempty.
The proof of the Blocking Lemma will be decomposed, as in the marriage model, into
two propositions depending on whether or not µ(W 0) is equal to µW (W
0) (Proposition 2,
in Subsection 5.2, for the more simple case where they are diﬀerent and Proposition 3, in
Subsection 5.3, for the more involved case where they are equal). However, before proving
separately Propositions 2 and 3, we give the proof of Proposition 1, in Subsection 5.1, which
says that the Blocking Lemma holds for the particular case where, regardless of whether or
not µ (W 0) is equal to µW (W
0), there exists a firm in µ (W 0) which does not fill its quota at
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µ. But before moving to these three subsections, we also prove a series of four claims and
Lemma 1 which will be used in the proof of all three propositions since they hold regardless
of whether or not µ(W 0) is equal to µW (W
0) and whether or not all firms in µ (W 0) fill their
quota at µ.
Claim 1.1 For each f ∈ µ(W 0), |µW (f)| = qf .
Proof of Claim 1.1. Assume otherwise and let f 0 ∈ µ(W 0) be such that |µW (f 0)| < qf 0 .
SinceW 0 is nonempty and f 0 ∈ µ (W 0) there existsw0 ∈W 0 such that f 0 = µ (w0)P (w0)µW (w0),
which implies that w0 /∈ µW (f 0). Moreover, µ ∈ IR (P ), the quota qf 0−separability of
P (f 0), and |µW (f 0)| < qf 0 imply that w0 ∈ Ch (µW (f 0) ∪ {w0} , P (f 0)). Thus, the pair
(f 0, w0) blocks µW , which is a contradiction.
Claim 1.2 Assume there exist f ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ µW (f), P (f))\{[µW (f) ∩
W 0] ∪ [µ(f) ∩ (W\W 0)]}. Then, w ∈W\W 0 and the pair (f, w) blocks µ.
Proof of Claim 1.2. Since w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ µW (f), P (f)) and w /∈ [µW (f) ∩ W 0] ∪
[µ(f) ∩ (W\W 0)], we have that either w ∈ W 0 and w ∈ µ(f)\µW (f) or w ∈ W\W 0 and
w ∈ µW (f)\µ(f). Assume w ∈W 0 and w ∈ µ(f)\µW (f). Then,
f = µ(w)P (w)µW (f). (8)
Moreover, w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ µW (f), P (f)) implies, by the substitutability of P (f), that w ∈
Ch(µW (f)∪{w}, P (f)), which together with condition (8) imply that the pair (f,w) blocks
µW . Therefore, we can assume that w ∈W\W 0 and w ∈ µW (f)\µ(f). Then,
f = µW (w)P (w)µ(w). (9)
Moreover, w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ µW (f), P (f)) implies, by the substitutability of P (f), that
w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)), which together with condition (9) imply that the pair (f,w)
blocks µ.
Claim 1.3 Assume there exists f ∈ µ(W 0) such that |µ(f) ∩W 0| > |µW (f) ∩W 0|. Then,
there exists w ∈W\W 0 such that the pair (f, w) blocks µ.
Proof of Claim 1.3. Assume f ∈ µ (W 0). We will first show that |µ(f) ∩W 0| >
|µW (f) ∩W 0| implies that there exists w ∈ Ch(µ(f)∪µW (f), P (f))\{[µW (f)∩W 0]∪[µ(f)∩
(W\W 0)]}. To see this, first observe that, by Claim 1.1, |µW (f)| = qf . Moreover,
|µW (f)| = |µW (f) ∩W 0|+ |µW (f) ∩ (W\W 0)| = qf
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and
|µ(f)| = |µ(f) ∩W 0|+ |µ(f)∩)W\W 0)| ≤ qf .
By hypothesis, |µW (f) ∩W 0| + |µ(f) ∩ (W\W 0)| < qf , and |µW (f)| = qf implies that
|Ch(µ(f) ∪ µW (f), P (f))| = qf . Hence, there existsw ∈ Ch(µ(f)∪µW (f), P (f))\{[µW (f)∩
W 0] ∪ [µ(f) ∩ (W\W 0)]}. By Claim 1.2, the pair (f,w) blocks µ.
Claim 1.4 Assume there exists f ∈ µ(W 0) such that |µ(f) ∩W 0| < |µW (f) ∩W 0| . Then,
there exist ef ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈W\W 0 such that the pair ( ef, w) blocks µ.
Proof of Claim 1.4. First observe that
|W 0| =
X
f∈µ(W 0)
¯¯
µ(f) ∩W 0
¯¯
≥
X
f∈µ(W 0)
¯¯
µW (f) ∩W 0
¯¯
,
which implies, by the hypothesis that there exists f ∈ µ(W 0) such that |µ(f) ∩W 0| <
|µW (f) ∩W 0| , that there exists ef ∈ µ(W 0)with the property that ¯¯¯µ( ef) ∩W 0 ¯¯¯ > ¯¯¯µW ( ef) ∩W 0 ¯¯¯ .
This ef satisfies the hypothesis of Claim 1.3, and hence, there exists w ∈ W\W 0 such that
the pair ( ef, w) blocks µ.
Lemma 1 Assume there exists f ∈ µ(W 0) such that |µ(f) ∩W 0| 6= |µW (f) ∩W 0|. Then,
there exist ef ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈W\W 0 such that the pair ( ef, w) blocks µ.
Proof. It follows from Claims 1.3 and 1.4.
5.1 There exists f ∈ µ (W 0) such that |µ (f)| < qf
We prove in Proposition 1 below that the Blocking Lemma holds for the case where (re-
gardless of whether or not µ(W 0) is equal to µW (W
0)) there exists f ∈ µ(W 0) such that
|µ(f)| < qf .11
Proposition 1 Assume f ∈ µ(W 0) is such that |µ(f)| < qf . Then, there exist ef ∈ µ (W 0)
and w ∈W\W 0 such that the pair ( ef,w) blocks µ.
Proof. Let f ∈ µ(W 0) be such that |µ(f)| < qf . By Claim 1.1, |µW (f)| = qf . We consider
two cases:
11Notice that f ∈ µ(W 0) and |µ(f)| < 1 are incompatible in the marriage model.
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Case 1. |µ(f) ∩W 0| 6= |µW (f) ∩W 0| . By Lemma 1, there exist ef ∈ µ (W 0) and w ∈W\W 0
such that ( ef,w) blocks µ.
Case 2. |µ(f) ∩W 0| = |µW (f) ∩W 0| . Then, |µ(f) ∩ (W\W 0)| < |µW (f) ∩ (W\W 0)| since
|µ(f)| < qf = |µW (f)| . Hence, there exists w ∈ (µW (f) ∩ (W\W 0)) \ (µ(f) ∩ (W\W 0)) .
In particular, w ∈ (µW (f) ∩ (W\W 0)) \µ(f). Therefore, since w /∈ W 0, w /∈ µ(f), and
w = µW (f) we have that
fP (w)µ(w). (10)
Moreover, by the quota qf -separability of P (f) and the individual rationality of µW , w is a
good worker for f . Hence, |µ(f)| < qf implies
w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)). (11)
Conditions (10) and (11) say that f ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈W\W 0 are such that the pair (f,w)
blocks µ.
Therefore, from now on, and without loss of generality, we will assume that |µ(f)| = qf
for all f ∈ µ(W 0).
5.2 The case µ (W 0) 6= µW (W 0)
Before stating and proving the Blocking Lemma for this case (Proposition 2 below), we
find it useful to illustrate the diﬃculties of extending the proof used in the marriage model
to the many-to-one model. In the marriage model the proof proceeds as follows. Since
µ (W 0) 6= µW (W 0) consider a firm f ∈ µ(W 0)\µW (W 0) . Look at (the unique) w0 = µ(f)
who also belongs to W 0. Hence,
f = µ(w0)P (w0)µW (w
0). (12)
Since µW ∈ S(P ), there must exist w ∈W such that
w = µW (f)P (f)µ(f), (13)
otherwise (f,w0) would block µW . But f 6= µW (w0) implies that w /∈W 0, since f /∈ µW (W 0)
and µW (f) = w. Hence,
f = µW (w)P (w)µ(w). (14)
Conditions (13) and (14), f ∈ µ (W 0), and w ∈W\W 0 imply that the conclusion of the
Blocking Lemma holds.
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Now, we come back to our many-to-one model. Consider a firm f ∈ µ(W 0)\µW (W 0).
Look at one (among potentially many) w0 ∈ µ(f). By construction, w0 ∈ W 0 and therefore
condition (12) still holds. But now, and as a consequence of the stability of µW , we have
w0 /∈ Ch(µW (f) ∪ {w0}, P (f)). (15)
However, condition (15) does not give us immediately the existence of w /∈ W 0 such that
w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)).12 To find a worker with this property, we have to look at
the set Ch(µW (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)), because then, by substitutability of P (f), we will have
w ∈ Ch(µ(f)∪{w}, P (f)).Moreover, condition µW (f) ⊆W\W 0 now implies that condition
(14) only holds in the weak form; that is, f = µW (w)R(w)µ(w) because it could well be the
case that w ∈ µ(f) (and hence µW (w) = µ(w)). Claims 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 solve this double
diﬃculty of identifying such a worker w in Ch(µ (f)∪µW (f) , P (f)) with the property that
µW (w)P (w)µ(w).
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Proposition 2 Assume µ(W 0) 6= µW (W 0). Then, there exist f ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈ W\W 0
such that the pair (f,w) blocks µ.
Proof. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1. There exists f ∈ µ(W 0)\µW (W 0). This means that we can find w0 ∈ W 0
such that w0 ∈ µ(f), implying |µ (f) ∩W 0| ≥ 1. Moreover, f /∈ µW (W 0) implies that
|µW (f) ∩W 0| = 0. Therefore, |µ(f) ∩W 0| > |µW (f) ∩W 0|. Hence, by Claim 1.3 the
statement of Proposition 2 holds.
Case 2. There exists f ∈ µW (W 0)\µ(W 0). This means that we can find w0 ∈ W 0 such
that w0 ∈ µW (f), implying |µW (f) ∩W 0| ≥ 1. Moreover, f /∈ µ (W 0) implies that
|µ (f) ∩W 0| = 0. Therefore, |µ(f) ∩W 0| < |µW (f) ∩W 0|. Hence, by Claim 1.4 the state-
ment of Proposition 2 holds.
5.3 The case µ (W 0) = µW (W 0)
Proposition 3 Assume µ(W 0) = µW (W 0). Then, there exist f ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈ W\W 0
such that the pair (f,w) blocks µ.
12Condition (15) will imply that, since P (f) is quota qf -separable, |µW (f)| = qf whenever f ∈ µ(W 0).
However, Claim 1.1 is more general because it also holds for the case µ(W 0) = µW (W 0).
13Although they do it in the more general case without assuming µ(W 0) 6= µW (W 0) and |µ (f)| = qf .
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Before stating and proving several Claims and Lemmas needed to prove Proposition 3
we describe our strategy of proof as well as discuss why the natural extension of the proof
for the marriage model does not work in this many-to-one setup.
There are two alternative proofs of the Blocking Lemma for the marriage model in the
case where µ(W 0) = µW (W
0) (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). The first one is based on
the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make oﬀers. The second one derives
the existence of the desired blocking pair of µ directly from the stability and optimality
properties of µW . Our proof will mix both arguments.
The proof based on the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make oﬀers
identifies the blocking pair (f, w) of µ by looking at one of the last firms receiving an oﬀer
from a worker w0 ∈W 0. It is argued then that f will necessarily reject, as the consequence
of having received this oﬀer, a worker w /∈W 0. Therefore,
fP (w)µW (w)R (w)µ (w) (16)
and
µW
¡
f
¢
P (f)wP (f)µ(f) ∈W 0. (17)
The first strict preference of condition (17) is a consequence of w being rejected by f while
the second one follows from the fact that, before receiving w’s oﬀer (which was accepted
by f), worker µ(f) had already made an oﬀer to f.
In the many-to-one setup, condition (16) is still valid but the second strict preference
in condition (17) should be written as w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)). But now we can not
guarantee (as we did to justify the second strict preference in condition (17)) that all
workers in µ(f) had already made an oﬀer to f before it receives w’s oﬀer (for instance,
workers in W\W 0 who strictly prefer µW to µ may not have made such oﬀers). Therefore,
our proof will be based on the stability and optimality properties of µW although, at the
end, we will have to comeback to the proof using the deferred-acceptance algorithm applied
to a matching market with an adequately modified preference profile P 0. Before proceeding
with the formal proof of Proposition 3 we want to single out one of its general features as
well as some diﬃculties.
Most of our proof is carried out for the particular case where µ(w)R(w)µW (w) for all
w ∈ W. Once the Blocking Lemma is established for this case, we extend it to the general
case.
The first diﬃculty arises because in the marriage model µ(W 0) = µW (W 0) = F 0 holds
if and only if µ(F 0) = µW (F
0) = W 0 holds as well. Claim 3 below shows that µ(F 0) =
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µW (F
0) whenever µ(w)R(w)µW (w) for all w ∈W. Moreover, in the many-to-one setup the
set µ(F 0) = µW (F
0) ≡ W 00 may contain workers outside W 0. The proof in the marriage
model (based on the stability and optimality properties of µW ) proceeds by defining a new
matching market (F 0,W 0, P 0) and its corresponding workers-optimal stable matching µ0W ,
where P 0 coincides with P except that, for all f ∈ F 0, P 0(f) is the truncation of P (f) below
µ(f) (i.e., µ(f) is the last acceptable mate for f in P 0(f)).
The second diﬃculty we face now is that the truncation P 0 (f) may generate a non
substitutable preference profile, in which case the new matching market (F 0,W 00, P 0) may
not have a workers-optimal stable matching. We overcome this diﬃculty by undertaking
a non-trivial and drastic modification of P (f) which guarantees substitutability as well as
other properties that will be required later. The proof in the marriage model continues by
showing that µ0W 6= µW holds because otherwise, we would have µ(w)P 0(w)µ0W (w) for all
w ∈W 0 contradicting the weak Pareto-optimality of µ0W in (F 0,W 0, P 0).
Note that in our artificial many-to-one matching market (F 0,W 00, P 0), we can only guar-
antee that µ(w)R0(w)µ0W (w) for all w ∈ W\W 0, which is not suﬃcient to contradict our
weak Pareto-optimality result of Theorem 1.
We solve this third diﬃculty by defining a new matching market (F 0,W 00, P 00) where P 00
coincides with P 0 except that for all w ∈W 00\W 0, P 00(w) has µ(w) as the unique acceptable
firm. Since P 0 was substitutable, P 00 remains substitutable. Therefore, we can look at
µ00W and show, using the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make oﬀers, that
if µ00W = µ
0
W then µ
00
W 6= µW (observe that the Blocking Lemma follows directly when
µ00W 6= µW ).
The proof finishes (as in the marriage model) by showing that the matching µW in the
original matching market (F,W,P ) (obtained from µ0W and µW by letting µW (f) = µ
0
W (f)
if f ∈ F 0 and µW (f) = µW (f) if f /∈ F 0) is not stable and that the pair (f,w) that blocks
µW also blocks µ, and f ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈W\W 0.
We now go back to the formal proof. As we have already said, the proof of Proposition
3 will also be decomposed into two diﬀerent parts. First, we will show that its conclusion
holds for the particular case where µ(w)R(w)µW (w) for all w ∈ W . Then, using this fact,
we will show that Proposition 3 also holds for the general case.
Assume µ(W 0) = µW (W
0) and denote this set of firms by F 0; that is, F 0 = µ(W 0).
Claim 3 Assume µR(w)µW for all w ∈W . Then, µ(F 0) = µW (F 0).
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Proof of Claim 3. First note that
µ(w) = µW (w) for all w ∈W\W 0. (18)
Now,
µ(F 0) =
S
f∈F 0{[µ(f) ∩W 0] ∪ [µ(f) ∩W\W 0]}
= [
S
f∈F 0 µ(f) ∩W 0] ∪ [
S
f∈F 0 µW (f) ∩W\W 0]
= [µ(F 0) ∩W 0] ∪ [µW (F 0) ∩W\W 0]
= [µW (F
0) ∩W 0] ∪ [µW (F 0) ∩W\W 0]
= µW (F
0),
where the second equality follows from condition (18) and the fourth equality follows from
the assumption that µ(W 0) = µW (W
0).
Assume µR(w)µW holds for all w ∈W . Define the set of workersW 00 = µ(F 0) = µW (F 0)
and the new matching market (F 0,W 00, P 0), where the preference profile P 0 is defined from
P as follows: For every w ∈W 00, P 0(w) coincides with P (w) on F 0∪{w}. For every f ∈ F 0,
let P 0(f) be any preference relation on the subsets of W 00 compatible with the following
two properties:
(INT) SP 0(f)∅ if and only if S = S ∩ Ch (S ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) .
(MAX) S1P 0(f)S2P 0(f)∅ if and only if bSi = maxP (f){S ⊆W 00 | S∩Ch(S∪µ(f), P (f)) = Si},
i = 1, 2, and bS1P (f)bS2.
Lemma 2 below states that any P 0(f) satisfying properties (INT) and (MAX) above
is substitutable. But before stating it, we find useful to describe an algorithmic way of
obtaining such a preference relation. Moreover, the algorithm shows that such preference
relation on 2W
00
always exists.
Assume f ∈ F 0 and let P (f) be its preference relation on 2W . Given W 00, define a new
preference relation P 0(f) on 2W
00
by the following algorithm:
Step -1 (Cleaning): Eliminate from the ordering P (f) all sets containing workers inW\W 00.
Denote this preference relation on 2W
00
by eP (f).14
Step 0 (Renaming): Rename the acceptable sets of workers according to eP (f) in such a
way that eP (f) : eS1, eS2, ..., eSr.
14Obviously, preferences P (f) and eP (f) coincide on 2W 00 . Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2001)
shows that eP (f) remains substitutable.
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Step 1 (Constructing): Let eS1 be the best set according to P 0(f). Set T 1 = {eS1}.
Let T k be the output of Step k, with k < r.
Step k + 1 (Constructing): Define Qk+1 = eSk+1 ∩Ch(eSk+1 ∪µ(f), P (f)). If Qk+1 ∈ T k, set
T k+1 = T k. If Qk+1 /∈ T k locate Qk+1 in the (
¯¯
T k
¯¯
+ 1)-th place in the ordering of P 0(f)
and set T k+1 = T k ∪ {Qk+1}. The set T k+1 is the output of Step k + 1.
The algorithm stops at Step r with |T r| acceptable and ordered subsets of W 00 (notice
that |T r| ≤ r). Unacceptable subsets are unordered. Let P 0(f) be any preference relation
on 2W
00
that coincides with the ordering of these acceptable subsets. Example 3 below
illustrates the algorithm.
Example 3 Let W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} be the set of workers and assume that W 00 =
{w1, w2, w4}. Consider firm f with µ(f) = {w2, w4} and the substitutable and quota
2−separable preference relation
P (f) : w1w2, w1w3, w2w4, w3w4, w1w4, w2w3, w4, w3, w1, w2.
Step -1 (Cleaning): eP (f) : w1w2, w2w4, w1w4, w4, w1, w2.
Step 0 (Renaming): Obvious with r = 6.
Step 1 (Constructing): {w1, w2} is the best subset according to P 0(f). Set T 1 = {{w1, w2}}.
Step 2 (Constructing): Since Q2 = {w2, w4}∩Ch({w2, w4}∪ {w2, w4}, P (f)) = {w2, w4} /∈
T 1, the set {w2, w4} is located in the second place in the ordering P 0(f) and let T 2 =
{{w1, w2}, {w2, w4}}.
Step 3 (Constructing): Since Q3 = {w1, w4} ∩Ch({w1, w4} ∪ {w2, w4}, P (f)) = {w1, w4} ∩
{w1, w2} = {w1} /∈ T 2, the set {w1} is located in the third place in the ordering P 0(f) and
let T 3 = {{w1, w2}, {w2, w4}, {w1}}.
Step 4 (Constructing): Since Q4 = {w4}∩Ch({w4}∪ {w2, w4}, P (f)) = {w4}∩ {w2, w4} =
{w4} /∈ T 3, the set {w4} is located in the fourth place in the ordering P 0(f) and let
T 4 = {{w1, w2}, {w2, w4}, {w1}, {w4}}.
Step 5 (Constructing): Since Q5 = {w1}∩Ch({w1}∪ {w2, w4}, P (f)) = {w1}∩ {w1, w2} =
{w1} ∈ T 4 set T 5 = T 4.
Step 6 (Constructing): Since Q6 = {w2}∩Ch({w2}∪ {w2, w4}, P (f)) = {w2}∩ {w2, w4} =
{w2} /∈ T 5, the set {w2} is located in the fifth place in the ordering P 0(f) and let T 6 =
{{w1, w2}, {w2, w4}, {w1}, {w4}, {w2}}.
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The algorithm stops at Step 6 with five acceptable and strictly ordered subsets of W 00.
Therefore, let P 0(f) be any preference relation on subsets of W 00 = {w1, w2, w4} such that
P 0(f) : w1w2, w2w4, w1, w4, w2.
To finish the example, it is easy to check that P 0(f) satisfies properties (INT) and (MAX) of
its general definition. To illustrate property (INT) consider {w1} and note that {w1}P 0(f)∅
and {w1} = {w1} ∩ Ch({w1} ∪ {w2, w4}, P (f)). To illustrate property (MAX), consider
{w1} and {w4}; note that {w1}P 0(f){w4} and
{w1, w4} = max
P (f)
{S ⊆W 00 | S ∩ Ch(S ∪ {w2, w4}, P (f)) = {w1}},
{w4} = max
P (f)
{S ⊆W 00 | S ∩ Ch(S ∪ {w2, w4}, P (f)) = {w4}},
and {w1, w4}P (f){w4}.
Lemma 2 P 0(f) is substitutable.
Proof. See Subsection 5.4 at the end of the paper.
Lemma 3 Assume µ(w)R(w)µW (w) for all w ∈ W and µ(W 0) = µW (W 0). Then, there
exist f ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈W\W 0 such that the pair (f,w) blocks µ.
Proof. The proof follows from Claims 3.1 to 3.6 below.
Claim 3.1 For each f ∈ F 0, µW (f) = Ch (µW (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)) .
Proof of Claim 3.1. Assume µW (f) 6= Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)
¢
for some f ∈ F 0. By
Claim 1.1,
¯¯
µW (f)
¯¯
= qf . By the quota qf−separability of P (f),
¯¯
Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)
¢¯¯
=
qf . Therefore, there exists w ∈ µ(f) such that w ∈ Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)
¢ \µW (f). By
the substitutability of P (f),
w ∈ Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)
¢
. (19)
Since w ∈ µ(f)\µW (f) and f ∈ F 0 we have that w ∈W 0, which means
f = µ(w)P (w)µW (w). (20)
Conditions (19) and (20) imply that the pair (f, w) blocks µW , which is a contradiction.
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Define µW |F 0∪W 00 as the restriction of µW to the sets F 0 and W 00.
Claim 3.2 µW |F 0∪W 00 ∈ S(P 0).
Proof of Claim 3.2. Assume there exists a pair (f,w) which blocks µW |F 0∪W 00 in the
matching market (F 0,W 00, P 0) . That is,
fP 0(w)µW (w) (21)
and
w ∈ Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ {w}, P 0(f)
¢
. (22)
Condition (21) implies that
fP (w)µW (w). (23)
Since µW ∈ S(P ), condition (23) implies
w /∈ Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)
¢
. (24)
Now,
Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)
¢
= Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ {w}, P 0(f)
¢
, (25)
since
Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)
¢ (1)
= Ch
¡
Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)
¢
∪ {w}, P (f)¢
(2)
= Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)
¢
Equality (1) follows from Claim 3.1 and equality (2) follows from Remark 2. Then, Claim
2.3 used in the proof of Lemma 2 (see Subsection 5.4 at the end of the paper) implies
that condition (25) holds. Therefore, conditions (22) and (24) contradict the equality of
condition (25).
Let µ0W be the workers-optimal stable matching corresponding to the matching market
(F 0,W 00, P 0). This matching exists by Lemma 2.
Claim 3.3. For each f ∈ F 0, µ0W (f) = Ch(µ0W (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)).
Proof of Claim 3.3. We will first show that |µ0W (f)| = qf for all f ∈ F 0. By Claim 3.2
and the optimality of µ0W we know that for all w ∈W 00,
µ0W (w)R
0(w)µW |F 0∪W 00 (w) = µW (w) 6= w.
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Therefore, µ0W (w) 6= w, which implies
µ0W (w) ∈ F 0 for all w ∈W 00. (26)
Assume there exists f ∈ F 0 such that
¯¯
µ0W (f)
¯¯
< qf . Thus,
|W 00| = P
f∈F 0
|µW (f)| since W 00 = µW (F 0)
=
P
f∈F 0
qf by Claim 1.1
>
P
f∈F 0
µ |0W (f)| by the contradiction of the hypothesis
¯¯
µ0W (f)
¯¯
< qf .
Therefore, there must exists ew ∈W 00\µ0W (F 0); but this contradicts condition (26). Hence,
|µ0W (f)| = qf for all f ∈ F 0. (27)
Moreover, µ0W (f)P
0(f)∅ for all f ∈ F 0. By property (INT) in the definition of P 0(f),
µ0W (f) = µ
0
W (f) ∩ Ch(µ0W (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)).
Therefore, by condition (27), µ0W (f) = Ch(µ
0
W (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)).
Claim 3.4 µ0W 6= µW |F 0∪W 00 .
Proof of Claim 3.4. Consider the deferred-acceptance algorithm where workers make
oﬀers in the matching market (F 0,W 00, P 0). Let k denote the last step of the algorithm;
that is, the provisional matching produced at the end of this step is µ0W . Let f ∈ F 0 and
denote by Sjf the set of workers that made an oﬀer to f at step j of the algorithm. Now, letcWf be the set of workers outside W 0 that made an oﬀer to f during the algorithm which
was provisionally accepted. That is,
cWf = (w ∈W 00\W 0 | fP 0(w)µ(w) = µW (w) and ∃tw < k s.t. w ∈ Ch( tw[
j=1
Sjf , P
0(f))
)
.
The proof of Claim 3.4 is by contradiction. However, before proceeding with it, we
prove, in Claim 3.4.1 below, that if cWf 6= ∅ the conclusion of the Blocking Lemma follows,
and hence, Lemma 3. Therefore, once Claim 3.4.1 is proven we will be able to assume in
the remaining part of the proof of Claim 3.4 that cWf = ∅ for all f ∈ F 0.
Claim 3.4.1 Assume f ∈ F 0 and cWf 6= ∅. Then, there is w ∈ W 00\W 0 such that the pair
(f, w) blocks µ.
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Proof of Claim 3.4.1. Let w ∈ cWf . By definition of cWf , fP 0(w)µ(w) and, by definition
of P 0(w),
fP (w)µ(w). (28)
Moreover, there exists tw < k such that w ∈ Ch(
twS
j=1
Sjf , P
0(f)). By property (INT) in the
definition of P 0(f),
w ∈ Ch(
tw[
j=1
Sjf , P
0(f)) ⊆ Ch
Ã
Ch(
tw[
j=1
Sjf , P
0(f)) ∪ µ(f), P (f)
!
.
By the substitutability of P (f),
w ∈ Ch (µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (29)
Conditions (28) and (29) say that the pair (f,w) blocks µ.
To get either a contradiction, or else that we are already able to identify the blocking
pair (f,w) of µ whose existence would establish immediately that Lemma 3 holds, we would
like to look at the oﬀers made in the deferred acceptance algorithm at the step previous to
the last one. However, there may be workers inW 00\W 0 making their oﬀers precisely in the
last step and therefore, these workers have not been provisionally assigned to an f ∈ F 0
yet. In order to follow our strategy of proof we have to be sure that this is not the case.
Therefore, we will modify the preferences of workers in W 00\W 0 in such a way they will
make an oﬀer to µ(w) ∈ F 0 just in the first step of the algorithm.
Assume µ0W = µW |F 0∪W 00 . Let (F 0,W 00, P 00) be the matching market where P 00 is the
substitutable profile of preferences defined from P 0 as follows:
P 00(f) = P 0(f) for all f ∈ F 0,
P 00(w) = P 0(w) for all w ∈W 0, and
P 00(w) : µ(w) for all w ∈W 00\W 0.
Remember that µ(w) = µW (w) = µ
0
W (w) for all w ∈ W 00\W 0 and observe that P 00 is
substitutable.
Let µ00W be the workers-optimal stable matching for the matching market (F
0,W 00, P 00).
The next three claims refer to properties of this matching.
Claim 3.4.2 µ0W ∈ S(P 00) and µ00W (w) = µ0W (w) for all w ∈W 00\W 0.
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Proof of Claim 3.4.2. Assume that there exists a pair
¡
f,w
¢
that blocks µ0W in the
matching market (F 0,W 00, P 00) . Therefore w /∈ µ0W (f),
fP 00(w)µ0W (w) , (30)
and,
w ∈ Ch
¡
µ0W (f) ∪ {w} , P 00(f)
¢
.
By the definition of P 00,
w ∈ Ch
¡
µ0W (f) ∪ {w} , P 0(f)
¢
. (31)
Since µ0W ∈ S(P 0), condition (31) implies
µ0W (w)P
0(w)f. (32)
Conditions (30) and (32) imply that w ∈W 00\W 0 and
µ0W (w) = ∅. (33)
By the optimality of µ0W in the matching market (F
0,W 00, P 0), the definition of µW |F 0∪W 00,
and Claim 3.2 we have that, for all w ∈W 00,
µ0W (w)R
0(w)µW |F 0∪W 00 (w) = µW (w).
But for all w ∈W 00, µW (w) ∈ F 0. This contradicts condition (33). Therefore, µ0W ∈ S(P 00).
Hence, by the definition of P 00, µ00W (w) = µ
0
W (w) for all w ∈W 00\W 0.
To proceed with the proof of Claim 3.4 we need to assume that µ00W ∈ S(P 0). Claim 3.4.3
below says that we can do it without loss of generality, because otherwise the conclusion of
Lemma 3 follows directly.
Claim 3.4.3 Assume µ00W /∈ S(P 0). Then, there exist f ∈ F 0 and w ∈W 00\W 0 such that the
pair (f, w) blocks µ.
Proof of Claim 3.4.3. Assume µ00W /∈ S(P 0). Then, there exists a pair (f, w) such that
w /∈ µ00W (f),
fP 0(w)µ00W (w) , (34)
and
w ∈ Ch (µ00W (f) ∪ {w} , P 0(f)) . (35)
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By the definition of P 00,
w ∈ Ch (µ00W (f) ∪ {w} , P 00(f)) .
Since µ00W ∈ S(P 00), µ00W (w)P 00(w)f,which implies together with condition (34), that P 00(w) 6=
P 0(w), and thus w ∈ W 00\W 0. By Claim 3.4.2, µ00W (w) = µ0(w) = µ(w) and condition (34)
becomes fP 0(w)µ (w) . By definition of P 0, P 0 (w) = P (w); thus,
fP (w)µ (w) . (36)
By property (INT) in the definition of P 0,
Ch (µ00W (f) ∪ {w} , P 0(f)) ⊆ Ch(Ch (µ00W (f) ∪ {w} , P 0(f)) ∪ µ(f), P (f)) ,
which together with condition (35) imply w ∈ Ch(Ch (µ00W (f) ∪ {w} , P 0(f)) ∪ µ(f), P (f)) .
By the substitutability of P (f),
w ∈ Ch({w} ∪ µ(f), P (f)). (37)
Conditions (36) and (37) show that the pair (f, w) blocks µ. Moreover, f ∈ F 0 and w ∈
W 00\W 0.
Claim 3.4.4 Assume µ00W ∈ S(P 0). Then, µ00W = µ0W .
Proof of Claim 3.4.4. Notice that µ00WR
00(w)µ0WR
0(w)µ00W for all w ∈W 00. The first weak
preference follows from the optimality of µ00W in (F
0,W 00, P 00) and Claim 3.4.2. The second
follows from the hypothesis. If w ∈ W 00\W 0, Claim 3.4.2 implies that µ0W (w) = µ00W (w). If
w ∈W 0, by P 00(w) = P 0(w), µ00WR0(w)µ0W implies, µ00W (w) = µ0W (w).
Before proceeding with the proof of Claim 3.4 it is useful to recall that, without loss of
generality, we may assume now that cWf = ∅ and µ00W ∈ S(P 0) because otherwise, Claims
3.4.1 and 3.4.3 imply, respectively, Lemma 3.
Consider the deferred acceptance algorithm where workers make oﬀers in the matching
market (F 0,W 00, P 00). Notice that the algorithm has at least two steps, since workers in
W 0 6= ∅ make oﬀers to their corresponding firms matched through µ, and these oﬀers will
be rejected. Moreover, each worker w ∈ W 00\W 0 makes an oﬀer to µ(w) in the first step
of the algorithm, which is immediately accepted; furthermore, w is never rejected later on
during the algorithm, since µ(w) = µ00W (w).
Let f ∈ F 0 be one of the last firms to receive an oﬀer from a worker w ∈ W 0. We will
distinguish between the following two cases, depending on whether or not f rejects some
workers.
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Case 1. There exists w0 ∈W 0 such that f rejects w0 as a consequence of receiving the oﬀer
from w. Note that w0 may be w. Then, µ00W (w
0) = ∅. Since µ00W ∈ S(P 0), Claim 3.4.4 implies
µ00W (w
0) = µ0W (w
0) = ∅. Moreover, w0 ∈W 0 ⊆W 00 implies
µW |F 0∪W 00 (w0) = µW (w0) ∈ F 0. (38)
By Claim 3.2,
µW |F 0∪W 00∈ S(P 0). (39)
Therefore conditions (38) and (39) can not hold simultaneously because the optimality of
µ0W in the matching market (F
0,W 00, P 0) implies µ0WR(w
0)µW |F 0∪W 00 .
Case 2. There does not exist w0 ∈ W 0 rejected by f (as a consequence of receiving
w’s oﬀer). Therefore, by substitutability of P 00(f) and iterated application of Remark 2,
0 <
¯¯¯¯
¯Ch(k−1Sj=1 Sjf , P 00(f))
¯¯¯¯
¯ < qf . Since P 00(f) = P 0(f),
0 <
¯¯¯¯
¯Ch(
k−1[
j=1
Sj
f
, P 0(f))
¯¯¯¯
¯ < qf . (40)
Moreover, we claim that
µ(f) ⊆
k−1[
j=1
Sj
f
, (41)
otherwise, if there exists ew ∈ µ(f)\ k−1S
j=1
Sj
f
then, either ew ∈ W 0 or ew ∈ W 00\W 0. The latter
is not possible because, by definition of P 00(ew), worker ew had already made an oﬀer to
f in the first step of the algorithm. Assume ew ∈ W 0. By the contradiction hypothesis
(µ0W = µW |F 0∪W 00) and our assumption that µ00W ∈ S(P 0), ew makes an oﬀer to f in the
last step of the algorithm, which implies that either ew ∈ µ00W (f) or µ00W ( ew) = ew. But, both
conditions are false.
Finally, we obtain a contradiction as a consequence of the following four relationships.
Ch(
k−1S
j=1
Sj
f
, P 0(f))
(1)
$ Ch(Ch(
k−1S
j=1
Sj
f
, P 0(f)) ∪ µ(f), P (f))
(2)
= Ch(Ch(
k−1S
j=1
Sj
f
, P 0(f)) ∪ µ(f), P 0(f))
(3)
= Ch(
k−1S
j=1
Sj
f
∪ µ(f), P 0(f))
(4)
= Ch(
k−1S
j=1
Sj
f
, P 0(f)).
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The inclusion in (1) follows from Property (INT) in the definition of P 0(f) and the strict
inclusion follows from (40),
¯¯
µ(f)
¯¯
= qf , and the quota qf−separability of P (f). Equality
(2) follows from Remark 6, part 2, (see Subsection 5.4 at the end of the paper). The equality
(3) is a consequence of the substitutability of P 0(f) and Remark 2. Condition (41) implies
equality (4).
Now, we extend µ0W to the original matching market (F,W,P ) as follows:
µW (f) =



µ0W (f) f ∈ F 0
µW (f) f /∈ F 0
and µW (w) =



µ0W (w) w ∈W 00
µW (w) w /∈W 00
.
It is straightforward to verify that µW is a matching.
Claim 3.5 For all w ∈W , µWR(w)µW . Moreover, µW /∈ S(P ).
Proof of Claim 3.5. By Claim 3.4 and the definition of µW , µW 6= µW . If w /∈ W 00,
µW (w) = µW (w). If w ∈ W 00, Claim 3.2 and the optimality of µ0W say that µWR0(w)µW .
Therefore, µWR(w)µW for all w ∈W . Hence µW /∈ S(P ).
Claim 3.6 Assume the pair (f,w) blocks µW . Then, the following three conditions hold:
(3.6.1) f ∈ F 0,
(3.6.2) w ∈W\W 00, and
(3.6.3) (f, w) blocks µ.
Proof of Claim 3.6. Assume (f,w) blocks µW . Therefore,
fP (w)µW (w) (42)
and
w ∈ Ch (µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (43)
To prove condition (3.6.1) assume the contrary; that is, f /∈ F 0. By the definition of
µW , µW (f) = µW (f). Condition (43) then implies
w ∈ Ch (µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (44)
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By Claim 3.5, µW (w)R(w)µW (w) for all w ∈ W . Hence, either fP (w)µW (w)P (w)µW (w)
or fP (w)µW (w) = µW (w). Therefore,
fP (w)µW (w). (45)
Conditions (44) and (45) say that the pair (f,w) blocks µW , which contradicts its stability.
To prove condition (3.6.2) assume w ∈W 00. Then, by definition of µW , µW (w) = µ0W (w).
Therefore, by condition (42),
fP (w)µ0W (w). (46)
By condition (3.6.1) of this Claim, f ∈ F 0 and by the definition of µW , µW (f) = µ0W (f).
Therefore, by condition (43),
w ∈ Ch (µ0W (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (47)
Conditions (46) and (47) imply µ0W /∈ S(P ). Since f ∈ F 0, condition (46) implies that
fP 0(w)µ0W (w). But µ
0
W ∈ S(P 0) and w /∈ µ0W (f) imply
w /∈ Ch (µ0W (f) ∪ {w}, P 0(f)) . (48)
Now,
Ch (µ0W (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) = Ch (µ0W (f) ∪ {w}, P 0(f)) , (49)
since
Ch (µ0W (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) = Ch (Ch (µ0W (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)) ∪ {w}, P (f)) by Claim 3.3
= Ch (µ0W (f) ∪ µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) by Remark 2
and Claim 2.3 used in the proof of Lemma 2 (see Subsection 5.4 at the end of the paper).
Conditions (47) and (48) contradict equality (49). Thus, w ∈W\W 00.
To prove condition (3.6.3) notice that by condition (3.6.1) of this Claim and the defini-
tion of µW ,
µW (f) = µ
0
W (f). (50)
Conditions (43) and (50) imply that w ∈ Ch (µ0W (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . By Claim 3.3, w ∈
Ch (Ch(µ0W (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . By Remark 2,
w ∈ Ch (µ0W (f) ∪ µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) .
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Finally, by the substitutability of P (f),
w ∈ Ch (µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (51)
Since w ∈W\W 00 we have that µW (w) = µW (w) = µ(w). By condition (42),
fP (w)µ(w). (52)
Conditions (51) and (52) imply that the pair (f, w) blocks µ.
Once Lemma 3 is proved, our objective in order to prove Proposition 3 is still to identify
a particular blocking pair (f,w) of the matching µ. Remember that Proposition 3 is more
general than Lemma 3 because the former does not assume µ (w)R (w)µW (w) for all w ∈
W . To look for this blocking pair, we will first identify a blocking pair of the matching that
assigns to each worker w his most preferred firm amongst µ(w) ∪ µW (w). Then, we will
show that this pair blocks µ as well.
Define µ ∨W µW as follows: for every w ∈W ,
µ ∨W µW (w) =



µ(w) if w ∈W 0
µW (w) if w /∈W 0
and for every f ∈ F ,
µ ∨W µW (f) =



[µ(f) ∩W 0] ∪ [µW (f) ∩ [W\W 0]] if f ∈ µ(W 0)
µW (f) if f /∈ µ(W 0).
Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2001) shows that if µ were a stable matching then
µ∨W µW would be stable as well. However, it is immediate to see that under the hypothesis
of next lemma, µ∨W µW is an individually rational matching. We state this fact as Remark
5 below.
Remark 5 Assume |µ(f)| = qf and |µ(f) ∩W 0| = |µW (f) ∩W 0| for all f ∈ µ(W 0). Then,
µ ∨W µW ∈ IR(P ).
Lemma 4 Assume |µ(f)| = qf and |µ(f) ∩W 0| = |µW (f) ∩W 0| for all f ∈ µ (W 0) . Then,
(4.1) µW (f) = Ch (µW (f) ∪ µ ∨W µW (f), P (f)) for all f ∈ µ (W 0) .
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(4.2) If there exists f ∈ µ (W 0) such that µ(f) 6= Ch ¡µ(f) ∪ µ ∨W µW (f), P ¡f¢¢ then,
there exists w ∈W\W 0 such that the pair (f,w) blocks µ.
Proof. To prove (4.1), assume µW (f) 6= Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ µ ∨W µW (f), P
¡
f
¢¢
for at least
one f ∈ µ (W 0) . Then, there exists w ∈ Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ µ ∨W µW (f), P
¡
f
¢¢ \µW (f). By the
substitutability of P (f),
w ∈ Ch
¡
µW (f) ∪ {w}, P
¡
f
¢¢
. (53)
By the definition of µ ∨W µW (f), w ∈ µ(f) ∩W 0. Then,
f = µ(w)P (w)µW (w). (54)
Conditions (53) and (54) imply that the pair (f,w) blocks µW , contradicting µW ∈ S(P ).
To prove condition (4.2), assume there exists f ∈ µ (W 0) with the property that µ(f) 6=
Ch
¡
µ(f) ∪ µ ∨W µW (f), P
¡
f
¢¢
.Then, there exitsw ∈ Ch
¡
µ(f) ∪ µ ∨W µW (f), P
¡
f
¢¢ \µ(f).
By the substitutability of P (f),
w ∈ Ch
¡
µ(f) ∪ {w}, P ¡f¢¢ . (55)
By the definition of µ ∨W µW (f), w ∈ µW (f) ∩W\W 0. Then,
f = µW (w)P (w)µ(w). (56)
Conditions (55) and (56) imply that the pair (f,w) blocks µ.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Remember that we may assume that |µ(f)| = qf for all f ∈
F 0; otherwise, the conclusion of Proposition 3 follows from Proposition 1 in Subsection
5.1. Furthermore, by Lemma 1, we can also assume that |µ(f) ∩W 0| = |µW (f) ∩W 0| for
all f ∈ F 0 as well. Thus, the hypotheses of Remark 5 and Lemma 4 hold. Therefore,
µ ∨W µW ∈ IR(P ). Moreover,
|µ ∨W µW (f)| = qf for all f ∈ F 0. (57)
To identify a blocking pair of µ ∨W µW we will apply Lemma 3 to the matching µ ∨W µW .
We next check that all the hypotheses of Lemma 3 are satisfied:
• The fact that µ ∨W µWR(w)µW for all w ∈W follows from its definition.
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• The set {w ∈W | µ∨W µW (w)P (w)µW (w)} coincides with the setW 0 already defined
from µ.
• The equality µ ∨W µW (W 0) = µW (W 0) follows from the fact that
µ ∨W µW (W 0) =
S
w∈W 0
µ ∨W µW (w)
=
S
w∈W 0
µ(w) by the definition of µ ∨W µW
= µ(W 0)
= µW (W
0) by the general assumption of Subsection 5.2.
Therefore, by Lemma 3, there exist f ∈ µ(W 0) and w ∈ W\W 0 such that (f,w) blocks
µ ∨W µW . That is,
w /∈ µ ∨W µW (f), (58)
fP (w)µ ∨W µW (w), (59)
and
w ∈ Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (60)
As a consequence of the matching µ ∨W µW being blocked by the pair (f,w), we will
establish that the following claim holds for this pair (f, w).
Claim P.3 There exists w ∈ µ(f) ∩W 0 such that w /∈ Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) .
Proof of Claim P.3. Assume ew ∈ Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) for all ew ∈ µ(f)∩W 0.
By conditions (57) and (58), |µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ {w}| = qf + 1. By condition (60), there existsbw /∈ Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . By hypothesis, bw /∈ µ(f) ∩W 0; thus, by the definition
of µ ∨W µW (f), bw ∈ µW (f) ∩ (W\W 0). By the substitutability of P (f),
bw /∈ Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ {w} ∪ µW (f), P (f)) . (61)
But
Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ {w} ∪ µW (f), P (f))
= Ch (Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ µW (f), P (f)) ∪ {w}, P (f)) by Remark 2
= Ch (µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) by Lemma 4, part (4.1),
together with condition (61), the quota qf -separability of P (f), and the fact that w is a
good worker for firm f imply
w ∈ Ch (µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (62)
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Condition (59) and the definition of µ ∨W µW imply that
fP (w)µ ∨W µW (w)R(w)µW (w). (63)
Conditions (62) and (63) contradict µW ∈ S(P ).
Consider w ∈ µ(f) ∩W 0 with the property that w /∈ Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) ,
whose existence follows from Claim P.3. By the substitutability of the preference relation
P (f), w /∈ Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ {w} ∪ µ(f), P (f)). Again by the substitutability of P (f)
and Remark 2,
w /∈ Ch (Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (64)
We distinguish between the following two cases:
Case 1. µ(f) 6= Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)) . Lemma 4, part (4.2), implies that the
conclusion of Proposition 3 follows.
Case 2. µ(f) = Ch (µ ∨W µW (f) ∪ µ(f), P (f)) . Condition (64) implies that
w /∈ Ch (µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) , which together with the quota qf -separability of P (f) implies
w ∈ Ch (µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (65)
Condition (59) and the definition of µ ∨W µW yield
fP (w)µ ∨W µW (w)R(w)µ(w). (66)
Conditions (65) and (66) say that the pair (f, w) blocks µ, where f ∈ F 0 and w ∈ W\W 0.
5.4 P 0(f) is substitutable
Since f will be fixed through out all this Subsection 5.4, we will write P , P 0, q, and µ
instead of P (f), P 0(f), qf , and µ(f), respectively. Moreover, we will use w to denote the
set {w}.
Claim 2.1 Assume S1P 0∅. Then, Ch(bS1, P ) = bS1, where bS1 = maxP{S ⊆W 00 | S∩Ch(S∪
µ, P ) = S1}.
Proof of Claim 2.1. First, by definition of the choice set, Ch(bS1, P ) ⊆ bS1. Assume
there exists w ∈ bS1\Ch(bS1, P ). By the substitutability of P , w /∈ Ch(bS1, P ) implies w /∈
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Ch(bS1 ∪ µ, P ). Therefore, w /∈ S1. Hence, S1 ⊆ Ch(bS1, P ). Moreover, S1 is also a subset of
Ch(bS1 ∪ µ, P ). Therefore,
S1 ⊆ Ch(bS1, P ) ∩ Ch(bS1 ∪ µ, P )
= Ch(bS1, P ) ∩ Ch(Ch(bS1, P ) ∪ µ, P ) by Remark 2
⊆ bS1 ∩ Ch(bS1 ∪ µ, P ) since Ch(A,P ) ⊆ A
= S1 by the definition of bS1.
Therefore, Ch(bS1, P ) ∩ Ch(Ch(bS1, P ) ∪ µ, P ) = S1, contradicting the definition of bS1.
Claim 2.2 Let S and B be such that S ∩ Ch (S ∪ µ, P ) = Ch(B,P 0). Then, for all A,
Ch (S ∪ µ ∪A,P ) = Ch(Ch(B,P 0) ∪ µ ∪A,P ).
Proof of Claim 2.2. Note that S can be written, by hypothesis, as
S = Ch(B,P 0)
◦
∪ S, (67)
where S = {w ∈ S | w /∈ Ch (B,P 0)} and the symbol ◦∪ means the disjoint union of sets.
Thus, S ∩ Ch (S ∪ µ, P ) = ∅. Therefore, if w ∈ S, we have that w /∈ Ch (S ∪ µ, P ). Then,
by the substitutability of P ,
if w ∈ S then w /∈ Ch (S ∪ µ ∪A,P ) for all A. (68)
Thus,
Ch (S ∪ µ ∪A,P ) = Ch(Ch(B,P 0) ∪ S ∪ µ ∪A,P ) by (67)
= Ch(Ch(B,P 0) ∪ µ ∪A,P ) by (68).
Claim 2.3 Let T be such that Ch(T, P ) = Ch(T ∪ µ, P ). Then, Ch(T, P ) = Ch(T, P 0).
Proof of Claim 2.3. By Remark 2, Ch(T ∪ µ, P ) = Ch(Ch(T, P ) ∪ µ, P ). The
hypothesis and property (INT) in the definition of P 0 imply that Ch(T, P )P 0∅. Assume
that Ch(T, P ) 6= Ch(T, P 0), then
Ch(T, P 0)P 0Ch(T, P )P 0∅. (69)
By property (MAX) in the definition of P 0, let bS be the maximal set (according to the
preference relation P ) such that
bS ∩ Ch(bS ∪ µ, P ) = Ch(T, P 0). (70)
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Moreover, since
Ch(T, P ) = Ch(T, P ) ∩ Ch (Ch(T, P ) ∪ µ, P ) ,
property (MAX) in the definition of P 0 and conditions (69) and (70) imply
bSPCh(T, P ). (71)
Claim 2.2 says that condition (70) implies, for B = T, S = bS, and A = ∅,
Ch(bS ∪ µ, P ) = Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ µ, P ).
Furthermore,
Ch(bS ∪ Ch(T, P ), P ) = Ch(bS ∪ Ch(T ∪ µ, P ), P ) by hypothesis
= Ch(bS ∪ T ∪ µ, P ) by Remark 2
= Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ T ∪ µ, P ) by Claim 2.2 (for A = T )
= Ch(T ∪ µ, P ) since Ch(T, P 0) ⊆ T
= Ch(T, P ) by hypothesis.
This equality implies Ch(T, P )R(f)bS, which contradicts (71).
Claim 2.4 Assume T is such that |Ch (T, P 0)| = q. Then, Ch(T, P ) = Ch(T ∪ µ, P ).
Proof of Claim 2.4. Let T be such that |Ch (T, P 0)| = q. Then,
Ch(T, P ) = Ch(T ∪ Ch(T, P 0), P ) since Ch(T, P 0) ⊆ T
= Ch(Ch(T, P ) ∪ Ch(T, P 0), P ) by Remark 2
= Ch(Ch(T, P ) ∪ Ch(T, P 0) ∪ µ, P )
= Ch(T ∪ Ch(T, P 0) ∪ µ, P ) by Remark 2 again
= Ch(T ∪ µ, P ) since Ch(T, P 0) ⊆ T,
where the unjustified equality follows from the fact that, |Ch(T, P 0)| = q implies, by the
quota q−separability of P and property (INT) in the definition of P 0, that Ch(T, P 0) =
Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ µ, P ).
As a consequence of Claims 2.3 and 2.4 we can state the following Remark.
Remark 6 Let T be such that |Ch(T, P 0)| = q. Then,
(1) Ch(T, P 0) = Ch(T, P ) = Ch(T ∪ µ, P ).
(2) Ch(T ∪ µ, P ) = Ch(T ∪ µ, P 0).
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Claim 2.5 Assume w and B are such that w ∈ B, Ch(B,P 0)P 0∅, and w /∈ Ch(B,P 0).
Then, w /∈ Ch(Ch(B,P 0) ∪ w ∪ µ, P ).
Proof of Claim 2.5. Assume otherwise; that is,
w ∈ Ch (Ch(B,P 0) ∪ w ∪ µ, P ) . (72)
Since Ch(B,P 0)P 0∅, by property (INT) in the definition of P 0, Ch(B,P 0) = Ch(B,P 0) ∩
Ch(Ch(B,P 0)∪µ, P ). This guarantees the existence of bS (the best subset according to the
preference relation P ) such that
Ch(B,P 0) = bS ∩ Ch(bS ∪ µ, P ). (73)
Define V = Ch
³bS ∪ w,P´ . Then,
Ch(V ∪ µ, P ) = Ch(Ch(bS ∪ w,P ) ∪ µ, P ) by the definition of V
= Ch(bS ∪ w ∪ µ, P ) by Remark 2
= Ch(Ch(B,P 0) ∪ µ ∪ w,P ) by Claim 2.2.
(74)
Claim 2.5.1 V 6= bS.
Proof of Claim 2.5.1. Assume otherwise. Then,
Ch(V ∪ µ, P ) = Ch(bS ∪ µ, P ). (75)
By condition (72) (the contradiction hypothesis of Claim 2.5), w ∈ Ch(Ch(B,P 0) ∪ w ∪
µ, P ). Hence, by equalities in (74) and (75), w ∈ Ch(V ∪ µ, P ) = Ch
³bS ∪ µ, P´ . By
the substitutability of P , w ∈ Ch
³bS ∪ w,P´ = V , implying that w ∈ bS. Then, w ∈bS ∩Ch³bS ∪ µ, P´ = Ch(B,P 0), contradicting w /∈ Ch(B,P 0), an hypothesis of Claim 2.5.
This proves Claim 2.5.1.
By the definition of V and Claim 2.5.1,
w ∈ Ch
³bS ∪ w,P´ = V. (76)
Now, by conditions (72) and (74),
w ∈ Ch(V ∪ µ, P ). (77)
Define
L = V ∩ Ch(V ∪ µ, P ). (78)
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Observe that, by (76) and (77),
w ∈ L. (79)
Now, condition (78), L ⊆ Ch(V ∪ µ, P ), substitutability of P, and L ⊆ V, imply
L ⊆ Ch(L ∪ µ, P ),
which in turn implies,
L = L ∩ Ch(L ∪ µ, P ).
Therefore, by property (INT) of the definition of P 0, LP 0∅. Moreover, L ⊆ B because
L = V ∩ Ch(V ∪ µ, P ) by the definition of L
= Ch(bS ∪ w,P ) ∩ Ch(Ch(bS ∪ w,P ) ∪ µ, P ) by the definition of V
= Ch(bS ∪ w,P ) ∩ Ch(bS ∪ w ∪ µ, P ) by Remark 2
⊆ w ∪ [Ch(bS, P ) ∩ Ch(bS ∪ µ, P )] since w belongs to both sets
= w ∪ [bS ∩ Ch(bS ∪ µ, P )] by Claim 2.1
= w ∪ Ch(B,P 0) by (73) (the definition of bS)
⊆ B because w ∈ B.
Since w ∈ L (condition (79)) and w /∈ Ch(B,P 0) (hypotheses of Claim 2.5), then
L 6= Ch(B,P 0). Therefore, Ch(B,P 0)P 0LP 0∅, because L ⊆ B.
Hence, by property (MAX) in the definition of P 0,
bSPV. (80)
On the other hand, by definition, V = Ch(bS ∪ {w}, P ) and, by Claim 2.5.1, V 6= bS.
Therefore, V P bS which contradicts (80).
Claim 2.6 Let w1, w2 ∈ T be such that w1 6= w2, w1 ∈ Ch(T, P 0), and w1 /∈ Ch(T\w2, P 0).
Then,
(1) Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(T\w2, P 0), P ) 6= Ch(T, P 0).
(2) Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(T\w2, P 0), P ) 6= Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(T\w2, P 0) ∪ µ, P ).
Proof of Claim 2.6 (1) Assume otherwise. We will distinguish between the following
two cases:
Case 1. |Ch(T, P 0)| < q. Then, our contradiction hypothesis and the quota q−separability
of P imply that Ch(T\w2, P 0) ⊆ Ch(T, P 0). Since w2 /∈ Ch(T\w2, P 0), Ch(T\w2, P 0) ⊆
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Ch(T, P 0)\w2 ⊆ T\w2. Therefore, Remark 1 implies Ch(T\w2, P 0) = Ch(T, P 0)\w2, which
is a contradiction because w1 ∈ Ch(T, P 0)\w2 and w1 /∈ Ch(T\w2, P 0).
Case 2. |Ch(T, P 0)| = q. Then, by Remark 6, part (1), Ch(T, P 0) = Ch(T, P ) = Ch(T ∪
µ, P ). Therefore, by hypothesis, w1 ∈ Ch(T ∪ µ, P ). Then, by the substitutability of P ,
w1 ∈ Ch(w1 ∪ µ, P ). Hence, by property (INT) in the definition of P 0, w1P 0∅. Therefore,
Ch(T\w2, P 0)P 0∅. (81)
By the substitutability of P, the fact that Ch(T\w2, P 0)∪w1 ⊆ T, and w1 ∈ Ch(T ∪µ, P ),
we have
w1 ∈ Ch(Ch(T\w2, P 0) ∪ w1 ∪ µ, P ). (82)
The hypothesis w1 /∈ Ch(T\w2, P 0), w1 ∈ T\w2, and conditions (81) and (82) contradict
Claim 2.5.
(2) Assume otherwise. Then, by Claim 2.3,
Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(T\w2, P 0), P ) = Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(T\w2, P 0), P 0).
Remark 1 and the equality above imply that
Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(T\w2, P 0), P ) = Ch(T, P´ ),
since Ch(T, P 0) ⊆ Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(T\w2, P 0) ⊆ T . But this contradicts part (1) of this
Claim.
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume P 0 is not substitutable; that is, there exist w1, w2 ∈ T such
that w1 6= w2, w1 ∈ Ch(T, P 0), and w1 /∈ Ch(T\w2, P 0). By Claim 2.6, part (2),
Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(Ch(T\w2, P 0), P ) 6= Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(T\w2, P 0) ∪ µ, P ).
We will distinguish between the following two cases:
Case 1. Ch(Ch(T, P 0)∪Ch(T\w2, P 0)∪µ, P ) 6= Ch(Ch(T, P 0)∪µ, P ). Remember that, in
Subsection 5.2, we are assuming |µ| = q. By the quota q−separability of P , the cardinality
of the two sets is equal to q. Since, by assumption, the two sets are not equal, there exists
w such that
w ∈ Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ Ch(T\w2, P 0) ∪ µ, P ) (83)
and
w /∈ Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ µ, P ). (84)
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Condition (83) implies, by the substitutability of P ,
w ∈ Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ w ∪ µ, P ). (85)
But, conditions (84) and (85) imply
w /∈ Ch(T, P 0) (86)
and w ∈ T. Conditions (85) and (86) contradict Claim 2.5.
Case 2. Ch(Ch(T, P 0)∪Ch(T\w2, P 0)∪µ, P ) = Ch(Ch(T, P 0)∪µ, P ). Again, by property
(INT) in the definition of P 0, Ch(T, P 0) = Ch(T, P 0) ∩ Ch (Ch(T, P 0) ∪ µ, P ). Therefore,
Ch(Ch(T, P 0) ∪ µ, P ) ⊇ Ch(T, P 0).
By hypothesis,
w1 /∈ Ch(T\w2, P 0) (87)
and w1 ∈ Ch(T, P 0). Hence, by the substitutability of P , we have
w1 ∈ Ch(Ch(T\w2, P 0) ∪ w1 ∪ µ, P ). (88)
By the substitutability of P , w1 ∈ Ch (w1 ∪ µ, P ). Hence, w1 = w1 ∩ Ch (w1 ∪ µ, P ),
implying, by property (INT) in the definition of P 0, that w1P 0∅. But this, together with
w1 ∈ T\w2, implies Ch(T\w2, P 0)P 0∅. Therefore, conditions (87) and (88) contradict Claim
2.5.
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